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Practicing Equal Employment
Opportunity Law on Behalf of an
Employer: An Overview
By W. NicHoLAs POPEe
The Civil Rights Act of 19641 applies to virtually every
individual who is employed or who seeks employment in the
United States. Through its 1972 Amendments and Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex,2 the Act mandates equal work
situations for minorities by race, religion, age and sex. As a result,
corporate personnel departments have begun to revolutionize
their approach to employment practices by balancing manpower
requirements with the expanded legal obligations imposed by
the Act. For corporate attorneys practicing equal employment
opportunity law, more than the letter of the law is involved, and
the legal problems and procedures are unique.
At the outset of every Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission [hereinafter cited as EEOC] investigation of a discrimina-
tion case, the "Charging Party" is the person against whom the
alleged discrimination occurred, and the employer is the "Re-
spondent." The typical claim states that the charging party is
treated differently from others and that this treatment constitutes
discrimination based on the charging party s race, sex, age or
national origin. Defense of a claim, usually on the grounds that no
discrimination occurred or that the discrimination is a bona fide
occupational qualification,3 begins when the respondent is notified
by the EEOC that a charge of discrimination has been filed and
* A.B.J. 1964, J.D. 1967, University of Kentucky; Attorney, Law Department,
Ashland Oil Inc., five years, concentrating on Equal Employment Opportunity
Law. Member American, Kentucky and Boyd County Bar Associations. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author.
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
229 C.F.R. § 1604 (1972).
3 See text at page 885 infra.
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that no retaliatory action can be taken against the charging party.
If alleged violations occur in a state with an approved state
deferral agency (the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights is
an approved provisional agency as is the Kentucky Department of
Labor when wage and hour claims are brought), the EEOC defers
to this agency, and respondents are notified that the claim and in-
vestigation will be handled by the state authorities. Since notice
is given by a form reciting only the nature, date and place of the
alleged violation, respondent's attorney should immediately con-
sult with the EEOC Regional General Counsel's Office or the
state deferral agency to determine the particulars of the violation.
Obtaining additional information allows the respondent to co-
operate more fully with the investigating agency, especially if
the respondent is a large corporation without immediate knowl-
edge of the alleged violation.
Respondent must then await its turn in the heavy caseload
of the EEOC and/or the state deferral agencies. The waiting
period for a state agency investigation is limited to 60 days from
the date of EEOC deferral, and the agency must reach a decision
or settlement and report back to the EEOC within this time
period. If the state deferral agency takes no action within 60
days, jurisdiction returns to the EEOC. However, the tremendous
backlog of EEOC case work can delay action for up to two years,
a time lag which can be detrimental to both parties, but par-
ticularly to corporations having staff and management changes
between the alleged violation date and subsequent EEOC action.
During pendency of the EEOC action, respondents must preserve
all records which might be required by the EEOC. Even job
applications, which typically are destroyed after a short period,
ought to be preserved where "failure to hire" is charged.
If the claim is settled by the state agency, the problem may
end at this point; however, if the EEOC decides to conduct its
own investigation, it can examine any and all facets of the place
of employment where the alleged violation occurred.4 Title VII,
Sections 709(a) and (c) and 710 define the scope of investiga-
tions and authorize EEOC access to relevant information. Al-
4 Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971); Blue Bell Boots,Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).
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though the court in Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC5 declared that
Title VII should not be construed narrowly, the decision restricts
discovery by the EEOC to information which tends to establish
patterns of unlawful discrimination. This holding was strongly
reaffirmed in Graniteville Co. v. EEOC,8 yet in practice the EEOC
may attempt to conduct fishing expeditions.7 Since the courts
tend to take affirmative stands on all admitted evidence for fear
of appearing prejudiced,8 it becomes the respondents' attorneys'
task to limit the discovery undertaken by the EEOC. While
respondents must, of course, cooperate with the EEOC, attorneys
for respondents must be acutely aware of the limits of EEOC's
discovery power and object when EEOC investigators request
irrelevant information. However, the courts have strictly limited
respondents' discretion in determining whether specific informa-
tion ought to be given to EEOC investigatorsf Making immediate
contact with the EEOC after notice of a claim to ascertain the
facts constituting the alleged discrimination enables respondents'
attorneys to more effectively evaluate the relevancy of the in-
formation requested. This contact with the EEOC initiates the
adversary process, and respondents' attorneys have a duty to limit
the EEOC investigators to that information which is actually
needed to describe the circumstances of a charge.10
It is important to note that the goal of the EEOC is to guar-
antee equal employment opportunities to all applicants;" to this
end, the EEOC may utilize all its powers under the Act to obtain
an accurate picture of the employment practices of the corporate
client. Under the 1972 amendments, the EEOC has power to
subpoena witnesses and documents, thus giving it access to any
information it considers relevant. 12 If the charge is "failure to
hire," the EEOC may request the records of all applicants for all
5418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
6 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971).
7 Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).8 See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
o See cases at note 4 supra.
10 Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
1Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1965).
1229 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (1972) states:
To effectuate the purposes of Title VII, as amended, any member
of the Commission shali have the authority to issue subpoenas requiring
the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence,
including, but not limited to, books, records, correspondence, or docu-
ments, in the possession or under the control of the person subpoenaed.
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vacancies, including "walk-in" applicants, and it may request
that these records be categorized by job grouping, age, sex or
race. Further it may request the number hired and the number
rejected, the number of job offers given and the number accepted,
and statistics describing the employment progress of a group or
groups of employees.
CONCILIATION
After investigation should the EEOC find reasonable cause to
believe that a violation has been committed, it assumes the role
of conciliator. 13 Under Section 706(b), conciliation is an entirely
voluntary process consisting of meetings among the EEOC con-
ciliation officer and attorneys, the corporate attorney, and the
charging party (who is not typically represented by counsel at
this level of the proceeding) in an effort to reach an agreement
of conciliation. The agreement generally provides relief for the
charging party and requires affirmative action by the corporation
to remedy unlawful employment and personnel practices. Even
where the corporation has a qualified compliance program, it is
required to reaffirm the principal affirmative actions in the con-
ciliation agreement. This agreement, if executed by the EEOC,
the respondent, and the charging party, terminates the claim
and is the final settlement for all parties involved. The conciliation
agreement is not public notice or public record. (An example pro
forma conciliation agreement negotiated by the respondent with
both the charging party and with the EEOC is appended.)
There are two basic types of conciliation. The first, and least
common, is referred to as a "pre-decision settlement"14 which in-
volves the respondent's immediate agreement with the EEOC
as to the nature of the alleged unlawful practice. Generally
utilized when the respondent has unknowingly caused the charg-
1329 C.F.R. § 1601.19d(a) (1972):
Following receipt of the full investigative fie, the Commission shall
consider and decide the issues presented and serve a copy of its de-
cision upon the parties. If the Commission determines that the charge
fails to state a valid claim for relief under Title VII, or that there is not
reasonable cause to believe that a charge is true, the Commission shall
dismiss the charge. Where, however, the Commission determines that
there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment
practice has occurred or is occurring, it shall endeavor to eliminate such
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
1429 C.F.R. § 1601.19c (1972).
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ing party to be treated in a disparate manner, a pre-decision
agreement includes relief for the charging party, an agreement
by respondent to comply with the law, and a waiver of the
charging party's right to sue and the EEOC's right to sue in his
behalf. The agreement should contain language protecting the
respondent, such as a non-admission clause, a non-public clause,
and any other special provisions respondent will need due to his
particular circumstances. Respondent should always attempt to
conciliate at this stage since it allows the most favorable presenta-
tion of respondents position.
The most frequently used conciliation process is the "post-
decision conciliation," which is employed where the respondent
is unsure or unaware that he is guilty of the violation alleged in
the charging party's complaint and waives the pre-decision right
to conciliate. This allows the EEOC to make a full investigation
and render a formal decision based upon its findings. At this point
respondent will request conciliation, or absent this request, the
EEOC will ask the respondent whether it desires conciliation.
At the conciliation meeting, the respondent should be represented
by its attorney and its equal employment coordinator or com-
pliance officer.' 5 The EEOC will be represented by its con-
ciliation officer who, in effect, also represents the charging party
since he is not usually present at this initial meeting. Prior to
meeting with the respondent, the EEOC conciliation officer will
meet with the charging party to determine the remedies he de-
mands and will present these demands to respondent.
The EEOC conciliation officer arrives at the meeting with a
prepared conciliation agreement, presents it for reading and
expects the respondent to sign it, or, if respondents attorney and
compliance officer do not have authority to execute corporate
agreements of this nature, to execute a commitment to sign.
Respondent, of course, is not required to do either and may
desire instead to use the initial meeting to discover the relief
demanded by the EEOC on behalf of the charging party. He
must then determine whether there is any tactical advantage in
executing the conciliation agreement. If the respondent declines
to execute the agreement, he has an opportunity to evaluate the
1541 C.F.R. § 60-2.22(a) (1972).
KErrUcKY LAW JOuRNAL
demands of the charging party and the EEOC and to examine
carefully the proposed conciliation agreement to determine
whether any changes are necessary. Respondent may then request
a meeting with the charging parties to discuss the nature of his
complaint and demands and to negotiate with him, if possible.
Any meeting between respondent and charging party should
be arranged by or through the conciliator who may absent him-
self from the meeting at the request of both parties, if charging
party has counsel. Absent counsel of charging party, the con-
ciliator will be present to represent the charging party. The
entire conciliation process is confidential, and publication of
concessions or demands by either party without consent is strictly
forbidden under Title VILI6 After this bargaining session, re-
spondent should request another meeting with the EEOC, return
the conciliation agreement drafted in a manner acceptable to it,
and specify those demands of the charging party that it will be
able to meet. The respondent may also report to the conciliation
officer that it will not conciliate further. At this point, if the
conciliation officer has reason to believe that the act charged was
unlawful, it may advise the charging party to sue or it may sue in
his behalf.
CouRT ACTION
The conferees contemplate that the Commission will continue
to make every effort to conciliate as is required by existing
law. Only if conciliation proves to be impossible do we expect
the Commission to bring an action in Federal District Court
to seek enforcement. 17
Should conciliation fail or should the charging party be dissatisfied
with the result of the investigations, hearing or recommendations
of the EEOC, the charging party or the EEOC can initiate pro-
ceedings in federal district court. The legislative history of Title
VII reveals that, as originally passed by the House of Representa-
tives, the bill was intended not merely to authorize but to
obligate the EEOC to institute actions to enforce the Act. These
enforcement provisions were stricken as a result of compromises
worked out in the Senate by Senators Dirksen, Humphrey and
1029 C.F.R. §§ 1601.20, 1601.24 (1972).
17 118 CONG. REc. 1861 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Perkins).
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others to effect "a transfer of litigating responsibilities from the
Commission to the Attorney General."18 However, the 1972 Equal
Employment Opportunities Enforcement Bill (the Civil Rights
Act of 1972) returned the power of litigation to the EEOC.
In the district court proceeding, plaintiff (charging party)
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation
occurred.19 Plaintiff need not establish discriminatory intent;
he is only required to prove that defendant's employment practices
in fact result in discrimination. In Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.,20 the Eighth Circuit held that where statistics
show an unusually small number of black employees, except in
manual labor, a prima facie case of violation of the Civil Rights
Act (Title VII) is established. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,21 held that statistics show-
ing an abnormally low number of non-white members in the con-
struction unions established a prima facie case of discrimination,
shifting the burden of going forward to the defendant.22
Once plaintiff establishes the discriminatory practice, the
defendant must justify its existence. The Act permits an employer
to establish guidelines, known to industry as "bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications" (BFOQ), for hiring applicants or promoting
employees. While little or no distinction may be made on the
basis of race or sex, employers may utilize reasonable testing
procedures to determine job qualifications so long as there is a
viable relationship between the test given and the job sought.
The leading case in this area is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2
where the plaintiff claimed that he was denied promotion as a
result of testing procedures which placed him at an intellectual
disadvantage and bore no relation to the "inside" heavy manual
labor job to which he aspired. Duke Power Company had used
the testing procedure in question for many years, requiring it of
all persons seeking employment or advancement from plaintiff's
1 8 UmTED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF TrrLEs VII AND XI OF CIVIL RcnTs Acr OF 1964, at 2057, 3005(1965).
'9 Barnes v. Lemer Shops of Texas, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Tex. 1971).20433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
21 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), ceit. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1972).
2 2 See also EEOC v. United Assn of Journeymen, 438 F.2d 408 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 822 (1972); United States v. Local 38, I.B.E.W.,
428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1969).23401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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level of employment. The Court held that the plaintiff was par-
ticularly disadvantaged under the testing scheme because he had
been culturally and educationally deprived as a result of his race
(Negro), and that there was no direct relationship between the
test and the job. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a
unanimous eight-man court, pointed out that Congress intended
to remove artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classifications:
Congress has now required that the posture and condition of
the job seeker be taken into account. ... The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates
to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.24
The Griggs language is pertinent in virtually all discussions of
employment practice today, and the phrase "business necessity"
has entered the argot of equal rights attorneys and litigants.
The Court further pointed out that Congress intended to
reach the consequences of employment and reiterated that the
law placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
job-related requirement has a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question. The guidelines which became part of
our case law as a result of the Griggs decision are not new. They
were issued by the EEOC as Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures on August 24, 1966, and were reaffirmed by guidelines
published in the Federal Register, August 1, 1970. The guidelines
demand that employers using tests have available data demon-
strating the capacity of the tests to select an applicant whose
work behavior is relevant to the job for which the applicant is
being evaluated.
In other litigation involving BFOQs, courts have held that an
airline practice of employing only female cabin attendants re-
quired business necessity rather than business convenience,
25
and that women must be allowed to perform heavy lifting jobs
previously considered as male-only work.26 Generally, any em-
24 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).2 5 Diaz v. Pan Am. Air Lines, 442 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 905 (1972).26 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ployment practice which creates unequal treatment between
groups must be based on job performance requirements, and
employers bear the burden of showing, through either statistics
or expert testimony, that the discrimination in question is related
to and justifies the unequal treatment.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,27 claims are not subject
to any jurisdictional time limits or filing requirements. Further,
a charging party maintaining an action under the 1866 Act does
not have to exhaust his available EEOC administrative remedies
if a "reasonable excuse" exists for failing to exhaust all EEOC
remedies. 28 Under Title VII, however, it is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to the filing of a suit by a private party that a charge be
filed with the EEOC against the party sought to be sued.
The amended Title VII also conditions federal district court
jurisdiction upon two other requirements: that the EEOC first
have an opportunity to resolve the claim through voluntary con-
ciliation between the charging party and the respondent, and
that the claim be filed within 90 days after the EEOC de-
clares conciliation impossible." The time limit for conciliation
may in practice continue until all attempts at settlement have
failed.
The 1972 Amendment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
affect the trial de novo concept of civil litigation at the district
court level. The action remains clearly de novo and separate
from the investigation and actions of the EEOC. From a practical
standpoint, now that the EEOC has litigation authority, its work
product will unquestionably be utilized at the trial court level.
While EEOC reports, findings and recommendations are not bind-
ing on a federal district court in terms of finding violation or a
lack thereof, the Fifth Circuit has held that EEOC pretrial work
products are admissible and highly probative of the ultimate issue
of discrimination involved in the case. In Smith v. Universal
2742 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).28 Because of the strong emphasis which Congress placed upon con-
ciliation, we do not think that aggrieved persons should be allowed
intentionally to by-pass the Commission without good reason. We hold,
therefore, that an aggrieved person may sue directly under section 1981
if he pleads reasonable excuse for his failure to exhaust EEOC
remedies.
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
29 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 706(f)(1) (1970).
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Services, Inc., 0 the court admitted the report under the Federal
Business Records Act exception to the hearsay rule primarily
because the EEOC was not a party to the litigation and the report
had not been prepared for possible litigation. It should be noted
that the 1972 Amendment will invalidate the basis for the Smith
decision inasmuch as the EEOC can now become directly in-
volved in litigation.
CLAss AcTIoN
After several months of operation under the amended act, the
EEOC has yet to bring a substantial number of law suits on
behalf of individual charging parties. Instead, those initiated to
date have been class actions alleging more than one type of
violation or discrimination. Class actions generate the greatest
publicity due to the enormous awards of cumulated back pay
frequently granted to the class of employees deemed to have been
injured by the discriminatory practice. It should be noted that
a defined class may not necessarily include all persons actually
injured by the specified discriminatory practices, and res judicata
does not apply to subsequent suits by members of the class who
invoked the "opt out" provision or by persons outside the desig-
nated class. Therefore, an individual charging party may seek
relief in a separate action on the same grounds as the class in a
prior class action suit. Under Title VII, separate suits may also
be brought for noncompliance with a court order issued under
Section 706.1 The fact that litigation existed is not as important
as if there had been relief, and respondents can expect charging
parties, or those entering on their behalf, to proceed until the
discriminatory practice has completely abated. It should be
noted that a charge filed by a single charging party alleging
discrimination on some new and seemingly insignificant grounds
may allow respondents to "buy time" by settling his claim. A
later class action can often be avoided by investigating the
grounds for the solo claim and correcting any overlooked area of
disparate behavior within the corporate framework.
Under the 1972 version of Title VII, Section 706(b), a charge
may be fied "... . by or on behalf of.. ." the person who then
80454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972).
31 EEOC v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices, Plumbing & Pipe-
fitting Indus., Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
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becomes the charging party, allowing greater use of the class
action device. The trend appears to be toward more modest and
manageable classes in order to prevent back pay awards from
becoming so large that they distract the court by their very size.
Congress recognized that the public good would be best served
by the maintenance of class actions under procedures set forth
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter cited as
F.R.C.P.].32 The early case of Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.3
limited back pay recovery in a class action to those parties who
qualified under F.R.C.P. Rule 23(a) and who had previously filed
charges with the EEOC. However, this holding was subsequently
rejected in Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.34 and Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp.5
In Oatis, the court pointed out that requiring numerous em-
ployees to file similar complaints with the EEOC was a waste of
time and said:
The better approach would appear to be that once an ag-
grieved person raises a particular issue with the EEOC, which
he has standing to raise, he may bring an action for himself
and the class of persons similarly situated.36
The court further described the need to allow a class action, as
follows:
Racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination and
to require a multiplicity of separate, identical charges before
the EEOC, filed against the same employer, as a prerequisite
to relief through resort to the court would tend to frustrate our
system of justice and order....37
The court then established three criteria as guidelines for class
actions: (1) a class action must meet the requirements of Rules
23(a) and 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
(2) the charging party may raise on behalf of the class only those
issues which he himself has standing to raise, and (8) members
of the class need not bring a charge with EEOC as a prerequisite
to joining the litigation as co-plaintiffs.
32FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a),(b)(2).
33251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
34 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
35 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
36 Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968).
371d. at 499.
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In Jenkins the Fifth Circuit further explained the appropriate-
ness and necessity of the class action as a means of seeking relief
from discriminatory practices:
Indeed, if class-wide relief were not afforded expressly in any
injunction or declaratory order issued in Employee's behalf,
the result would be the incongruous one of the Court-a Fed-
eral Court, no less-itself being the instrument of racial dis-
crimination.38
Jenkins then cites Oatis as authority, charging the court with the
duty and power in the conduct of a trial to grant relief and to
treat common things in common and to distinguish the dis-
tinguishable. The various circuit courts of appeals are quite
liberal in their view of class actions and have, in several instances,
actually increased the size of the class beyond that recognized
by the federal district court where they find it necessary ". . . in
the public interest, to provide relief which goes beyond the limited
interest of the charging party.,9
RECENT DEVmLOPmNs: MATEmNiTY LEv]W
The Guidelines for Discrimination Because of Sex provide:
A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which
excludes from employment applicants or employees because
of pregnancy is in prima facie violation of Title VII.
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage,
abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-
related purposes, temporary disabilities. . . . [p]olicies and
practices involving matters such as the commencement and
duration of leave, the availability of extensions .... formal
or informal, shall apply to disability due to pregnancy or
childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are ap-
plied to other temporary disabilities.40
A plethora of maternity leave litigation has followed the enact-
ment of these statutory guidelines. No decision trend has yet
emerged from the decided cases, and the issues may ultimately
38 Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968).
39 BleBell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 858 (6th Cir. 1969). The
courts in Blue Bell and Oatis increased the size of the class in each case beyond
the class as defined in Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 358 (D.C.
La. 1967).
40 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a),(b) (1972).
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require resolution by the Supreme Court. Cohen v. Chesterfield
County School Board,4' La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion,42 and Green v. Waterford Board of Education4 3 are now
before various circuit courts of appeals; Schattman v. Texas Em-
ployment Commission44 proceeded to the Supreme Court level
but certiorari was denied.45
In each of these cases the employer had a policy of terminating
pregnant employees at some specified point during the pregnancy,
thus eliminating the female employee's choice regarding how
far into the term of her pregnancy she would work. The law
clearly provides that employment policy may not dictate the
beginning date of maternity leave, leaving it to the woman, per-
haps with the aid of her physician, to decide how long she is
medically and physically able to work. In La Fleur, the district
court held that the Cleveland Board of Education's rule requiring
pregnant employees to leave employment five months prior to
delivery did not discriminate and was not so unreasonable as to
be unconstitutional.46 The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded
for further decision, 47 and the school board applied for certiorari
to the Supreme Court. The Green decision follows this same
pattern and has a similar conclusion, citing La Fleur. At present
there is great conflict between the circuit courts of appeals with
La Fleur, 6th Circuit, and Green, 2nd Circuit, holding that en-
forced maternity leave is discriminatory, while Cohen, 4th Cir-
cuit, and Schattman, 5th Circuit, hold that such leaves involve
no discrimination. Other than basic legal interpretation, the only
noticeable difference between the four cases is the length of time
prior to delivery that required leave: Cohen and Green, 4 months,
La Fleur, 5 months, and Schattman, 2 months. Final Supreme
Court resolution of this matter is needed to clarify the policy for
many boards of education since the 1972 amendments to Title VII
include public school systems within the scope of the statute.48
4141 U.S.L.W. 2390 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1973).
42465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3315
(U.S. Nov. 27, 1972).
43 41 U.S.L.W. 2419 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 1973).
44 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).4 5 Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 41 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1973).
46 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
47 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
4842 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1972).
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(The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cohen and La Fleur on
April 23, 1973, and set these cases for oral argument together.)
CONCLUSION
More than the letter of the law is involved in the practice of
EEO law by an attorney who regularly represents the corporate
client in administrative or judicial proceedings. The attorney
must know his client's business in order to provide preventive
counsel before any claims might be ified and to allieviate any
procedures which might be onerous under Title VII. The attorney
should have access to corporate management in order to assess its
personnel programs, from job vacancy advertisements and ap-
plication forms to criteria and methods involved in promotion or
termination of the employee. Since a discriminatory act may
occur at any stage of the relationship between applicant/ employee
and employer, the attorney must satisfy himself as to the legality
of the relationship.
Following the 1972 adoption of the Guidelines for Discrimina-
tion Because of Sex, an increasing number of complaints have
been sex-oriented and many of the lawsuits instituted by the new
litigation division of the EEOC are based on sex discrimination.
Final resolution by the Supreme Court of the maternity leave
controversy will clarify the position that employers should take in
this area. Virtually all employers will be required to restructure
their basic concepts of hiring, promotion and salary for female
employees, but until this is done discrimination charges arising
from these areas will probably grow and constitute the majority
of claims to be filed with the EEOC and the various local and
state human rights agencies.
APPENDIX
PRo Foim CONCILIATION AGREEMENT
The first 11 paragraphs of the agreement are standard clauses
the EEOC will endeavor to insert in all conciliation agree-
ments and are included here for informational purposes. Al-
though respondent will be able to modify the language some-
what, there is almost no possibility of eliminating them entirely.
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Presume the facts giving rise to the charge are as follows.
Respondent has advertised in a local newspaper for a male em-
ployee to train as a field auditor with heavy travel requirements.
A female answers the ad, walks into the respondents employ-
ment office, and makes an application which is received, reviewed,
and the female is interviewed and found to be qualified. There
being other equally qualified applicants, a male is hired and the
female is rejected. The female files a discrimination charge with
the EEOC alleging she was not hired because of her sex. Sub-
sequent investigation appears to substantiate this charge, based
upon the newspaper advertisement.49
The conciliation agreement follows, respondent agreeing to a
back pay settlement in lieu of offering a job to the charging
party, who has since become employed elsewhere, and concedes
to several requirements imposed by the EEOC on behalf of the
charging party. Note that in paragraph 13 of the agreement the
EEOC investigation also determined that respondent was using
outdated and improper application forms. The EEOC was
entitled to examine all matters pertinent to the charge and this
paragraph is included to illustrate that point and the thorough-
ness of an investigation.
EXHIBIT A
Case No. S-I
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU-
NITY COMMISSION, and
MARY DOE
Complainant
and CONCILIATION
AGREEMENTI
SAMPLE COMPANY, INC.
Respondent
4 9 In Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577
(N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972), the court
held a newspaper could not be viewed as an employment agency when it
published help-wanted ads and had no obligation to examine the ads to determine
the propriety of their sexual requirements. Thus, in the hypothetical fact situation,
the newspaper will be innocent of wrongdoing if respondent requested a MALE
HELP WANTED listing.
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Charges having been filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and as amended 1972, by the Charging Party, the
parties hereby agree to and do settle the above matter in the
following extent and manner:
1. The Respondent agrees that the Commission, on request
of any Charging Party or on its own motion, may review com-
pliance with this Agreement. As a part of such review, the Com-
mission may require written reports concerning compliance,
may inspect the premises, examine witnesses, and examine and
copy documents.
2. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute an
admission by any Respondent of any violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or as amended 1972. All parties
agree to waive their rights to a formal determination, finding or
decision by the Commission on any matters which were or might
have been alleged as charges and settled by this Agreement.
3. The Charging Party hereby waives, releases, and covenants
not to sue any Respondent with respect to any matters which
were or might have been alleged as charges filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, subject to performance
by the Respondent of the covenants, promises and representations
contained herein, as they pertain to Charging Party. The Com-
mission shall determine whether the Respondent has complied
with the terms of this Agreement.
4. All hiring, promotion practices, and other conditions of
employment shall be maintained and conducted in a manner
which does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, age,
religion, or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 1972.
5. The Parties agree that there shall be no discrimination or
retaliation of any kind against any person because of opposition
to any practice declared unlawful under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended 1972; or because of the filing
of a charge; giving testimony or assistance; or participation in
any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 1972.
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6. The Respondent agrees that the notice required to be posted
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will be conspicuously
posted and kept upon its premises, operations and in all other
places where bulletins and notices to employees and applicants
for employment are customarily and generally posted and dis-
played.
7. The Respondent agrees that it will adopt and employ objec-
tives and reviewable procedures for the evaluation of applicants
for employment and the assignment, promotion and transfer of
employees. Within sixty (60) days from date of this Agreement
the Company will prepare and file with the Commission a docu-
ment listing each job classification in the Company and contain-
ing, with respect to each such job classification, a brief description
of the duties required to be performed, and setting forth the
minimal qualifications required of an individual filling such job
classification. In no event shall these minimum standards or
requirements exceed those now in existence and each such stan-
dard shall be validly related to the performance on the job to
which it is assigned.
8. The Respondent agrees to establish, and where instituted,
refine and strengthen on a continuing basis positive and ob-
jective non-discriminatory employment standards, procedures and
practices. These standards shall be validly and factually related
to the job for which they are assigned. To uniformly apply such
standards, procedures and practices without regard to race, color,
sex, age, religion, or national origin and in a manner as will assure
equal employment opportunities to all employees and applicants
for employment in all aspects of its work force and operations,
with emphasis in (but not exclusive of) those job categories and
areas where females, as well as Negroes, American Indians,
Spanish Surnamed Americans and other minorities have or may
have heretofore been not employed, under-employed and/or
tokenly employed.
9. It is understood that this Agreement is confidential between
those institutions, persons and companies, which are a party
hereto and that under the terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 706(b) this Agreement shall not be circulated
among those who are not a party hereto.
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10. Recruiting:
In order to recruit minority group applicants for employment,
Respondent agrees to establish continuing relationships as defined
below with the local office of the State Employment Service and
organizations in the area from which employees are drawn which
have as an object, the improvement of employment opportunities
for minority group persons.
Notification of Expected Vacancies in Coming Quarter
Within thirty (80) days of the date of this Agreement, Respondent
shall estimate the number of vacancies it expects during the
coming three months period in each job which it will not be
required to fill by promotion from within under a valid individual
or collective contract. It will notify the local office of the State
Employment Service, and each organization referred to above,
of the title of each such job, the expected number of vacancies,
the qualifications required and the starting pay. A similar esti-
mate and notification shall be made in each succeeding three
month period while this Agreement is in effect for a period of
twelve months.
11. Notification of Unexpected Vacancies
Whenever a vacancy occurs in any job which (1) was not included
in the quarterly estimate and (2) is not required to be filled by
promotion from within under valid individual or collective bar-
gaining contract, Respondent will notify the appropriate local
office of the State Employment Service and each organization
utilized. If practical, the notice will be by mail. Otherwise, the
notice will be by phone, and Respondent will keep a record of
each such notification.
12. Hiring Process
Respondent agrees that all female or minority group persons
contacting it will be specifically requested to file an application
for employment regardless of whether vacancies exist. Applica-
tions for employment made by members of minority groups,
either pursuant to the arrangements in Section 9, supra, or by
other means, will be promptly reviewed by the employer. All
applications will either be accepted, rejected, or held pending a
vacancy or further evidence of qualifications. An applicant will
not be rejected because the position applied for has been filled.
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All such applications will be reviewed to determine if some
position other than that applied for is available, either presently
or prospectively for the applicant. If it is or may be, the applicant
shall be so advised. If the applicant is not hired at once, the
application will be placed in an Affirmative Action File for con-
sideration for such position. Applicants will be notified in writing
of Respondents decision within five working days of the making
of the application.
1. Applicants who are hired will be treated with respect
to all terms, conditions and privileges of employment
without discrimination on the grounds of race, sex,
age, color or national origin.
2. If the applicant is rejected Respondent will:
(a) Advise him in writing of the reason;
(b) Send a copy of that rejection notice and informa-
tion on the reason for rejection to any listed
organization which referred said applicant;
(c) Retain a copy of the rejection notice as required
by the regulations of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (29 CFR 1602.14); and
(d) Submit a copy of the rejection notice to the
Commission in its quarterly report.
3. If the application is held pending a vacancy, or for
other cause not involving the disqualification of the
applicant it shall be processed in the manner de-
scribed below.
18. Respondent agrees that all future newspaper advertisements
seeking job applicants and job orders placed with agencies for
that purpose, will be placed without any reference or preference
as to sex of the applicant sought. Such "ads" shall be placed
under the heading "Help Wanted Male or Female."
14. Respondent represents that questions pertaining to arrest
records contained in its present employment application form,
will be blocked out before issuance to an applicant and no
applicant will be required to respond to such question. When
new application forms are required to be printed by Respondent,
all reference to arrest records will be eliminated therefrom.
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15. The Parties agree that the Commission's Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR, Chapter XIV, § 1604.1
through 1604.10 made a part of this Agreement as if set out in
full herein, shall be adhered to where applicable in all of Re-
spondent's operations.
16. Respondent agrees to pay and the Charging Party agrees to
accept the sum of $4,200 in full and complete settlement of
all claims due to the alleged act settled by this Agreement.
17. Respondent agrees to deposit with and hereby tenders for
delivery to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in
the person of its conciliation officer, as payment of the agreed
settlement referred to in paragraph No. 15 above, a check in the
amount of $4,200 payable to MARY DOE, said check to be
delivered to the payee upon approval of this Agreement by the
Commission.
18. Ninety days from the date of this Agreement, and each 90
days thereafter for a total of two years, or in accordance with the
reporting dates of Respondent as previously agreed upon be-
tween the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Re-
spondent, Respondent shall send to the Commission a written
report which shall include the following information:
(a) Applications received during the preceding quarter
by race, sex and source of referral;
(b) Persons hired by race, sex, source of referral and
job assignment;
(c) Minority group applicants rejected and the reason
for rejection;
(d) Copies of mailings to organizations and job orders to
employment agencies;
(e) Copies of newspaper or other advertisements seek-
ing applicants;
(f) Total number of minority group employees in each
job classification
[Vol. 61
1973] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW 899
SAMPLE COMPANY, INC. ATTEST:
By:
President Date:
CHARGING PARTY WITNESS:
Mary Doe Date
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
I Recommend Approval of this Agreement
T. A. Jones, Conciliator Date:
District Director Date
Chief of Conciliations Date
APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION
Director of the Office of Compliance Date
